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December 1996Abstract
This paper investigates a variety of objectives that are commonly used to motivate
government fiscal action. These include, welfare maximization, stabilization and
growth maximization. The policies are compared on the basis of their implications
for welfare, volatility and growth. We show that stabilization policies can produce
welfare levels that are nearly identical to those of welfare maximization policies and
that both welfare maximization and stabilization policies yield large welfare gains
and modest growth losses relative to growth maximization policies. We also show
that there are side issues to stabilization polices. In particular: (1) It is not possible
to stabilize all macroeconomic variables simultaneously, even when the number of
policy instruments is equal to the number of shocks; (2) stabilizing a particular
variable requires increased volatility of some other variable; (3) stabilization requires
some flexibility regarding the government’s budget constraint; and, (4) stabilization
requires the government to respond in a precise and immediate way to exogenous
shocks which hit the economy.1 Introduction
The ability of the federal government to affect the economy has long been recog-
nized. This has led many economists and policymakers to call on the government
to undertake responsibility for managing various aspects of the economy. These
responsibilities range from micro-management of specific farm product markets to
broad management of aggregate GDP. In this paper, we investigate a variety of pop-
ular broad fiscal policy objectives, including, welfare maximization, stabilization and
growth maximization. The various objectives are compared on the basis of their im-
plications for welfare, volatility and growth. In addition, we consider the political
feasibility of executing the policy rules that each of the objectives require.
The framework for our analysis is an analytically tractable endogenous growth
real business cycle model that allows closed form decision rules for households and
the government. The model is similar to one used by Hercowitz and Sampson (1991)
to integrate the analysis of growth and business cycles.
In our model, both welfare and growth maximization imply constant tax rates
over time. Such policies possess a high degree of political feasibility, given the slug-
gishness of the political process. In contrast, stabilization policies require frequent
and precise changes in tax rates, which we regard as much less politically feasible.
Moreover, stabilization requires flexibility in the government’s budget constraint that
may present additional political problems. Despite these issues, we continue to inves-
tigate the implications of stabilization policies for welfare, volatility and growth. Our
view is that if the benefits of stabilization are found to be sufficiently large, then this
may motivate reforms to the political process to accommodate the required flexibil-
ity. For example, stabilization policies might be accomplished through institutional
changes, such as unemployment insurance: that serve as automatic stabilizers, and
thus do not require period by period legislation.
We find that stabilization policies can produce welfare levels that are nearly iden-
tical to welfare maximization policies. Furthermore, both welfare maximization and
stabilization policies yield large welfare gains and modest growth losses relative to
growth maximization policies. The latter finding can be attributed to excessive sav-
1ings that results from a policy that focuses singly on growth. Thus, our model suggests
that welfare and stabilization policies are superior to a growth maximization policy.
Regarding the choice between stabilization or welfare maximization, additional
criteria should be considered. Taylor (1980) argues that there is some better measure
of utility that is too complicated to express which places a higher value on stabi-
lization. However, our model highlights some important side issues associated with
stabilization policies which reduce the attraction of Taylor’s argument. We show
that it may not be possible to stabilize all macroeconomic variables simultaneously
even when the number of policy instruments is equal to the number of shocks. Thus
there are many different reasonable stabilization polices. In addition, stabilizing a
particular variable requires increased volatility of some other variable; thus there
are destabilization costs.
1 These results arise because the tools available to policy
makers are unable to directly offset the random shocks, but instead must work in a
more round about way. These side issues show that even with a Taylor criterion, a
stabilization objective is ambiguous and may not dominate a welfare maximization
policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the private sector
and derive the associated decision roles. Section 3 derives an expression that governs
the per capita economic growth rate of the economy. Section 4 describes the various
fiscal objectives and derives the associated government policy rules. This section
also describes many qualitative implications of the various policies. In section 5, we
calibrate the model  in order to carry out quantitative analysis which is presented in
section  6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Private Sector
Our model combines the corporate and consumer sectors and focuses on a represen-
tative household that maximizes lifetime utility, subject to budget and production
constraints. T’he household’s objective is mathematically formulated as choosing
1 Smyth (1963) and Christian (1984) also show that stabilization policies may lead to destabilizing
outcomes.(1)
subject to
Lifetime utility, given by (1), is the sum of discounted momentary utility values
where utility is a function of choice variables  Ct, the amount of goods consumed at
time t, lt, the amount of time allocated to productive activities, and state variable
ht, an index of knowledge. This form of the utility function can be interpreted
as incorporating home production, as in Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright (1995).
Several features of this utility function warrant comment. The presence of  ht in (1)
and (3) implies that productivity in the home and productivity in the market increase
at the same rate. This ensures that lt remains stationary along the model’s balanced
growth path. The parameter g controls the elasticity of household labor supply. As g
becomes very large, the level of labor supplied approaches one and the model reduces
to one with a fixed labor supply.
Equation (2) is the temporal budget constraint, where yt denotes pre-tax income
and is the tax rate. After tax income is allocated to consumption and investment,
if. We allow for the possibility that a fraction Øt of investment expenditures may be
tax deductible. The variable øt is intended to capture the various elements of the tax
code that encourage investment. These include, investment tax credits, depreciation
allowances, and direct expensing of certain types of outlays, such as research and
development expenditures.
Output is produced by combining capital,  kt, and effective labor,  htlt, in a Cobb
Douglas technology given in (3). Knowledge augments the productive capacity of
each hour spent working. Following Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), it is assumed
3that knowledge grows proportionally to and as a by-product of accumulated private
equilibrium. We assume that households exist in large numbers so that no individual
make their decisions. Output is also affected by a random technology shock given by
The capital stock evolves according to (4), which implies a nonlinear relationship
between current investment and next period’s capital. This nonlinear form can be
interpreted as incorporating adjustment costs for new investment.
2 We also allow for
the possibility of shocks that directly impact capital accumulation. These shocks,
represented by  e
vt, can be interpreted as events that affect the economic value of
existing capital, and thus, its usefulness in producing new capital. An example might
be the oil price shocks of the 1970’s that reduced the economic value of energy
intensive equipment.
Because the model is analytically tractable, standard techniques can be used to




Per Capita Growth Rate
objectives is to study the effects of different fiscal policies on economic
growth. In what follows, we derive a general expression for the economy’s per capita
2This form has been used in applied work Hercowitz and Sampson (1991), Kocherlakota and
Yi ( 1994) and Cassou and Lansing (1995), among others.
4growth rate which will remain valid under all policies. Using (3), (4), (5) and (7), it
can be shown that the growth rate between time t and time t + 1 is given by
In addition to computing the growth rate under the various policies, this expression
is also used as the objective for the growth maximization policy.
4 Fiscal Policy Objectives
When economists or policy makers talk about reasonable macroeconomic objectives
for the government, many possibilities arise. Among the most common are, welfare
maximization, stabilization and growth maximization. Each of these objectives has
its own merits and limitations. In this section, we characterize the government’s
optimal decision rules under each objective and examine the qualitative implications
of each policy. Later, in Section 6, we undertake a quantitative analysis in a calibrated
version of the model. We begin by considering the problem in which the government
maximizes the welfare of the household. Next, we consider stabilization policies. We
show that stabilization policies can accomplish a number of tasks, but may be unable
to accomplish all desired tasks simultaneously. Thus, choices must be made as to
what variables will be stabilized. We focus on two particular stabilization objectives:
temporal utility stabilization and output stabilization. Finally, we investigate the
growth maximization policy.
4.1 Welfare Maximization
Ramsey (1927) considered the problem of how the government should set up a com-
modity tax system to raise a desired amount of revenue, while minimizing welfare
losses. In the dynamic version of the problem, the government chooses a sequence of
taxes over time to finance an exogenous stream of spending, while maximizing social
welfare. This is the formulation used by Lucas and Stokey (1983), Charnley (1986),
Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Zhu (1992), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994),
Cassou and Lansing ( 1995), and others. In this paper, we consider a variation on this
5this Ramsey problem which allows the government to recognize the way that required
spending is determined by the level of output. We model government spending,  gt,
dt 
= y t. (9)
This formulation implies that government expenditures on goods and services increase
in fixed proportion to the level of economic output. In formulating its policy, the
government takes this relationship into account.
3
We assume that the government balances its budget period by period.
4 To fi-
nance expenditures, the government imposes a tax on income at the rate  t t. The
government can also stimulate investment by allowing a portion of such spending to




ty t – øt  t t  it. (lo)
The government’s decision problem can be mathematically formalized as choosing
(7), (9) and (10).
procedures yield
regime:
Because the model is analytically tractable, standard optimization
the following optimal policy rules under the welfare maximization
(11)
(12)
3This formulation has slightly different implications than the traditional Ramsey problem in
which government expenditures are viewed as completely exogenous by the policy maker. Here, the
government understands that a policy which stimulates investment and output, also results in higher
government spending, which does not contribute to either production or utility. Thus, the welfare
maximizing policy calls for somewhat lowcr investment incentives than one where  gt is viewed as
exogenous.
4This assumption has been used by Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Glomm and
Ravikumar (1994), Cassou and Lansing (1995) among others. We believe this may be a closer
description of actual constraints than optimal tax studies which allow the government to borrow
or lend large amounts. For instance. Chamley (1986) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) find
in models with no limits on debt, that optimal policy can result in the government lending large
amounts of assets in the initial periods and then relying on interest from these assets to finance
expenditures in later periods.
64.2 Temporal Utility Stabilization
Stabilizing business cycle fluctuations has long been a concern of policy makers, and
is often associated with a Keynesian view of government’s role in the economy. Un-
fortunately, because the economy is very complicated and the policy tools very crude,
it is impossible to stabilize all aggregate variables simultaneously. This means that
choices must be made as to which of the many possible stabilization options are to be
pursued. In what follows, we illustrate the diversity of stabilization rules by focusing
on two particular stabilization schemes: temporal utility stabilization and output sta-
bilization. We show that complete stabilization of either can be accomplished singly.
However, simultaneous stabilization cannot be accomplished, even though the num-
ber of policy instruments is equal to the number of shocks. Furthermore, we show
that each policy produces side effects in that some other economic variable becomes
more variable.
In order for stabilization policies that involve changing tax rates to be feasible,
some other variable in the government budget constraint must give. In practice,
budgets are not balanced period by period and public debt is used to absorb the
shocks. Rather, than deal with debt, we maintain the balanced budget condition,
but allow gt to be determined as a residual which absorbs the revenue fluctuations
associated with changing tax rates. Thus, we relax the constraint (9).
We begin our analysis of stabilization policies by considering a simple extension
of the welfare maximizing problem in section 4.1. In particular, we assume the
government sets the steady state levels of the policy variables equal to the values
given in (11) and (12) and chooses taxes so that
(14)
(13)
7This policy is a bit of a hybrid in that it has the same steady state as the welfare max-
imization problem, but possesses features designed to reduce fluctuations in temporal
utility.
The above policy rules require the government to react in a precise and immediate
way to each shock as it hits the economy. It is likely, however, that political inertia
would limit the size and scope of any fiscal response unless the tax code was specifi-
cally designed to automatically adjust to changing economic conditions. However, if
the benefits of stabilization are sufficiently large, then it may be worthwhile for the
government to adopt institutional changes that streamline the bureaucracy required
to make changes to the tax law where automatic structures are not feasible.
To see that these rules will stabilize labor, consumption and therefore temporal
utility, note that (7) and (13) imply that  lt will be constant over time. Next, by
combining (3), (4), (5), (13) and (14), it can be seen that random fluctuations in the
capital stock are eliminated. This tax code is designed so that investment responds
in exactly the right amount to offset the capital accumulation technology shock,  e
vt.
As a result, the tax code induces investment volatility in order to achieve capital
stability. Now, because  kt = ht and lt are stabilized, (3) implies that the nonrandom
part of yt is stabilized. Although the technology shock  e
zt still produces a fluctuating
output stream, (13) implies that after tax income is completely smoothed. Equation
(6) implies that ct is also stabilized. Since ct, lt and kt = ht are all stabilized, temporal
utility is also stabilized.
The above scheme highlights some weaknesses of the stabilization policies we
consider. First, even when there arc as many policy tools as exogenous shocks,
the government cannot stabilize all macroeconomic aggregates. Under the policy
given by (13) and (14),  it and  yt continue to fluctuate. Indeed fluctuations in  it
actually increase. This occurs because the policy variables do not necessarily enter
in a way that permits them to directly offset the random shocks. Instead, policy
must attack the uncertainty in a round about way. Since it is impossible to stabilize
all aggregate variables, some choice must be made as to which variables will be
stabilized. In this example, we chose to stabilize temporal utility, while output was
8allowed to fluctuate. It could be reasonably argued that output stabilization is the
more attract ive objective. In the next section, we consider an alternative scheme that
is aimed at eliminating random fluctuations of output around trend.
4.3 Output Stabilization




Our analysis of this policy proceeds as follows. First, notice that (15) is constructed
so that the current labor supply lt responds by exactly the right amount to offset the
current output technology shock  e
zt. Next notice that (16) is constructed so that  it
responds to offset the capital accumulation shock  e
vt. The combination of (15) and
(16) implies that future capital stocks are not affected by current shocks. Because the
current shocks do not effect future capital stocks, which is the only way for the shocks
to be transferred across time periods, the effects of current shocks on current and
future output levels has been eliminated. Although, output has been stabilized, the
labor input is now more variable and therefore temporal utility is also variable. Again,
we see that there is an inability to stabilize all variables simultaneously and subjective
decisions must be made about which of the many options should be pursued.
4.4  Growth Maximization
Policy makers seem to almost interchangeably view growth and welfare. Of course,
high growth rates can produce very important welfare benefits such as an increase
in the standard of living over time. However, some caution must be taken when
designing policies to promote growth. It is well known that, high output levels driven
by high savings rates need not imply high living standards if savings is in excess
of the Golden Rule. Furthermore, monetary authorities may be concerned about
possible inflationary pressure in high growth economies. Since our model includes
only real variables, we do not address the latter concern. However, as we demonstrate
9below, growth maximizing policy can result in substantially lower welfare levels in
comparison to other fiscal objectives.
To maintain comparability with the previous policies, we continue to impose (10)
as the government budget constraint. Under the growth maximizing policy, the
     O} to maximize  (8) subject to (10). Standard
optimization techniques yield decision rules
(17)
(18)
Notice that growth maximization calls for policy to remain constant over time, as in
the welfare maximization problem of section 4.1.
5 Calibration of the Model
In general, parameters are assigned values based on empirically observed features
of the U.S. economy. Three calibrating criteria are used. Some values are based on
prior empirical findings, while others are assigned values so that the model’s balanced
growth path exhibits some characteristics that coincide with long-run observations for
the postwar U.S. economy. Finally, the exogenous shock processes are estimated by
using equilibrium conditions in the model and observed data to back out an implied
sequence of shocks. This shock data is then used to estimate the stochastic structure.
Two of the parameters where assigned values based on prior empirical work.
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988), we set g = 1.60, which implies
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply l /  (g – 1) is equal
to 1.7. As noted by these authors, this value lies about midway in the range of
empirical elasticity estimates. I.abor’s share of output, 1 –  q = 0.60, is chosen based
on empirical work by Christiano (1988), Ai and Cassou (1995), and others and is
close to the value of 0.58 used by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
Six of the parameters were chosen so that the model’s balanced growth path ex-
hibits characteristics that correspond to long run averages for the U.S. economy from
1948 to 1993. The value  y = 0.218 matches the average ratio of U.S. governmentspending to output over this period.
5 The values for ß,  d, B, A0. and  A l where cho-
sen simultaneously in order to match the following five statistics. (1) The after-tax
interest rate is 6.9%, which is the value estimated by Cooley and Prescott (1995). (2)
Households spend about one third of their time in market activities. (3) The invest-
(5) The per capita growth rate is 1.841%. In this matching process, steady state
values for the model’s tax rates need to be used. The steady state income tax rate
was set equal to 0.364 which is the average of the observed ratio of total federal, state
and local government receipts (Citibase series GGFR+GGSR+GGFSIN+GGSSIN)
to GDP. This value is close to the 0.35 baseline value used by Greenwood and Huff-
man (1991 ). The investment subsidy, ø&tt, includes a combination of depreciation
allowances and investment tax credits and was set to 0.07 which is the baseline
value used by Greenwood and Huffman (1991). This calibration process results in
ß = 0.985,  d = 0.0771,  B = 0.505,  AO = 0.706 and A1 = 1.233.
Finally, the parameters governing the exogenous technology shock process were
estimated by backing out implied series for  zt and vt from the data, given the cal-
ibrated parameters above. These observed shock series were then used to estimate
the first order autoregression processes for the model. This procedure resulted in
a 1 = 0.867,  s l = 0.0107,  a 2 = 0.343 and  s 2 = 0.0054.
6 Quantitative Policy Evaluation
In this section we undertake a quantitative comparison of the different fiscal objec-
tives. We compare policies based on their implications for business cycle character-
istics, growth and welfare. The business cycle and growth comparisons are based
on results from 1000 simulations of 46 periods under each policy while the welfare
comparisons are based on 1000 simulations of 500 periods. A summary of the results
is provided in Table 1. The first panel in Table 1 presents information about simula-
5 Data for this and other calculations were obtained from Citibase. The exception is the capital
stock data, which was obtained from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, U.S.
Department of Commerce (1993). Statistics based on capital stock data are for the period 1948 to
1992.
6We include spending on consumer durables as part of investment.
11tions based on the baseline tax rates which were used to calibrate the model. These
simulations show that the average growth rate is 1.85’% which is close to the value
we calibrated the model to. The baseline tax simulations illustrate an important
feature of our model: the percentage standard deviations for output, consumption
and investment are identical and these variables are perfectly correlated with one
another. This is simply a reflection of the household decision rules (5) and (6) which
show that with constant tax policy,  ct and it are constant fractions of total output
yt. Similar implications arise in the welfare maximizing and growth maximizing fiscal
policies where tax policies are also constant.
The next four panels compare results from the different fiscal objectives. Using
the parameters described in section 5, the welfare maximizing tax rates are  t t = 0.44
and  øt = 1.23 which imply an investment subsidy of øt t t = .54. Welfare maxi-
mizat ion calls for a large investment subsidy to offset household underinvest ment in
human capital that is a result of our learning by doing externality. Notice that the
constant tax rates implied by the welfare maximizing policy produce no change in
the volatilities of the different economic variables. Thus, a welfare maximizing policy
could not be considered an improvement based on a stabilization criterion. However,
the large investment subsidy of the welfare maximization policy induces a rapid rate
of growth and a large welfare gain over the baseline tax policy.
7 Welfare gains of this
magnitude were also reported by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) and are due to
the endogeneity of the growth rate.
Because the temporal utility stabilization policy works around the welfare max-
imizing tax rates, it also implies a sizable improvement in welfare and growth over
the baseline policy. Interestingly, the temporal utility stabilization policy yields very
similar welfare levels as the welfare maximizing policy. This is not surprising, since
both policies use the same steady state values for  t t and øt. As expected, the tem-
poral utility stabilization policy does eliminate fluctuations in consumption, labor
7 The welfare gain i n percent is computed according to the formula
100{exp[(l –  ß)(Vp – V b)]  – 1} , where V b is lifetimc utility under the baseline policy and  V p
is lifetime utility under the altcrnatice fiscal policy. This calculation is approximately the percentage
by which the baseline model path for ct must be raised in order to achieve the utility level calculated
under the alternative fiscal policies, where the approximation is due to random fluctuations about
the balanced growth path.and leisure. Furthermore, this is accomplished by inducing more variability in invest-
ment as reflected in the standard deviation of it which increases from 1. 19% under
the baseline policy to 5.49%. The increased investment variability also shows that a
temporal utility stabilization policy is unable to stabilize everything simultaneously
even though there are two policy tools and two sources of random fluctuations.
The implications for output stabilization are very similar to those of the temporal
utility stabilization policy. As in the temporal utility stabilization policy, there is a
sizable improvement in growth and utility over the baseline tax system, but virtually
identical growth and welfare levels as in the welfare maximization policy. Table 1
also shows that output stabilization has accomplished its objective. However, in this
case, the cost is somewhat higher because now, not only has investment volatility
increased, but consumption, labor, and leisure volatility have also increased.
The growth maximization policy implies t t = .56 and Øt = 1.25 and an investment
subsidy of øt t = 0.70. As expected, growth maximization calls for larger investment
incentives in comparison to welfare maximization. Table 1 shows that growth max-
imization results in a welfare gain over the baseline tax system. However, this gain
is considerably less than the gain obtained under the other three policies. This re-
sult indicates that growth maximization encourages savings in excess of the Golden
Rule level. This highlights a potential drawback of policies which focuses singly on
promoting output growth.
7 Conclusion
This paper compared a variety of government fiscal policy objectives. We found that
stabilization policies can produce welfare levels that are virtually identical to those
of welfare maximization if the steady state tax polices are appropriately chosen.
Moreover, both welfare maximization and stabilization policies yield large welfare
gains and modest growth losses relative to a growth maximization policy.
Because welfare maximization and stabilization policies can produce comparable
welfare levels and growth rates, choosing between them must be based on a num-
ber of side issues regarding stabilization policies. It was shown that; (1) it is not
13i
possible to stabilize all macroeconomic variables simultaneously even when there are
as many policy variables as there are exogenous shocks; (2) stabilizing a particular
variable requires increased volatility of some other variable; (3) stabilization requires
some flexibility regarding the government’s budget constraint; and, (4) stabilization
requires the government to respond in a precise and immediate way to shocks as
they hit the economy. Even if we assume that issues (3) and (4) can be politically
managed, issues (1) and (2) show that some priorities as to which variables will be
stabilized must be set and what level of volatility for the absorbing variables will be
tolerated.
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16Table 1: Economic Performance of Simulated Fiscal Policies
Baseline Welfare Temporal Utility Output Growth
Model Maximization Stabilization Stabilization Maximization
Variables [1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Output 1.194 0.129 1.000 1.194 0.129 0.734 0.102 0.000 0.718 1.194 0.129
Consumption 1.194 0.129 1.000 1.194 0.129 0.000 0.871 1.958 0.102 1.194 0.129
Investment 1.194 0.129 1.000 1.194 0.129 5.493 –0.090 5.493 –0.090 1.194 0.129
Hours 0.734 0.102 0.944 0.734 0.102 0.000 0.868 1.224 0.102 0.734 0.102
Productivity 0.554 0.224 0.900 0.554 0.224 0.734 0.102 1.224 0.102 0.554 0.224
Growth Rate         1 .85% (0.22%) 5.91% (0.23%) 5,90% (0.06%) 5.90% (0.00%) 6.19% (0.23%)
Welfare Gain Base 180.03% 180.02% 180.01% 150.27%
Notes: [1] Percentage Standard Deviation, [2] First-order autocorrelation, [3] Correlation with output.
Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviations. Business cycle statistics are based on logged and detrended variables,
where detrending is accomplished using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter equal to 10,
as recommended by Baxter and King (1995) for annual data.A Appendix
This appendix provides the derivations for the analytical results presented in the
paper.
A.1 The Household’s Problem
(1)
subject to
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as
(20)





where  a0 and b0 are constants to be determined. Substituting these into (21) and
solving for a0 gives
To find the consumption decision rule substitute (23) into (22) and solve for ct to
get
(6)
We can interpret 1 – a0 as the marginal propensity to consume out of after-tax income.




Finally, we need to verify that our guess was correct by verifying that  b0 is, in





19) into (20) to obtain
Substituting (28) into (27) and solving for  b0 yields
which is a constant and thus confirms our guess.
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(28)A.2 The Per Capita Growth Rate
To find the growth rate substitute (3) into (5) and use (7) to obtain
Substituting this into (4) yields
which implies
The growth rate between time t and time t + 1 is thus given by
A.3 The Government’s Problem: Welfare Maximization
O} to maximize
subject to













20It will be useful to reduce the number of constraints by eliminating some of the
variables. First note that (5) implies
Substituting the above expression into (10) and using (9) yields
yt, (4) to eliminate it, and (7) to eliminate lt. These substitutions reduce the choice
The first-order conditions are
i t  = a 1y t (32)
21for b1 yields
Next, note that (35) can be rearranged to obtain
(36)
(31), which then implies
(37)
(38)
Now substituting (36), (35) and (38) into the above expression, and solving for  a1A.4 The Government’s Problem: Growth Maximization
(8)
øt from the objective function. To do this, substitute
rearrange to obtain




By substituting (40) into (8), rearranging, and ignoring the constant terms and
exogenous shocks, the transformed objective can be written as
The above expression implies
given by
that the growth maximizing tax decision rule is
Now rearrange (39) to obtain
(17)
(18)
Note that both policy variables are constant as in the welfare maximization prob-
lem.
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